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The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention has influenced the development of many 
bilateral and multilateral international water agreements. There is ongoing debate 
on the extent to which the Watercourses Convention has influenced the Nile River 
Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). In this article, the author 
examines the interface between Watercourses Convention and CFA on some of the 
most contentious issues therein. It is argued that the Watercourses Convention has 
(in spite of various criticisms) greatly influenced the development of CFA in terms 
of the substantive and procedural contents of the agreement. The influence of the 
Watercourses Convention is more visible in shaping some of the major substantive 
principles such as the general obligation to cooperate, the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization, and the duty not to cause significant harm. The Watercourses 
Convention has also influenced the CFA‟s procedural rules such as the duty to 
exchange information, settlement of disputes and institutionalization of cooperation. 
In the era of increasing water security tension among the Nile River riparian states, 
the Watercourses Convention is set to dominate emerging new developments 
toward regulating the utilization, conservation, and management of the Nile River.   
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On 21 May 1997, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (Watercourses Convention) which it entered into force on 17 
August 2014.1 The adoption of the Watercourses Convention resulted from to a 
two-decade process the General Assembly had initiated.2 On 8 December 1970, 
the General Assembly adopted resolution 2666 (XXV), entitled „Progressive 
Development and Codification of the Rules of International Law Relating to 
International Watercourses‟.3 In the same resolution, the General Assembly 
recommended that the International Law Commission „take up the study of the 
law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses with a view to its 
progressive development and codification‟.4   
The Watercourses Convention is considered as one of the leading legal 
instruments in relation to non-navigational uses of international watercourses. 
The Watercourses convention has the advantage of being broad in concept and 
encompassing all aspects associated with non-navigational water use. The 
Watercourses Convention is basic framework convention that aims to regulate 
the different aspects of water use, water management, protection and 
conservation of transboundary watercourses, and „promote optimal and 
sustainable utilization thereof for present and future generations‟.5 As a 
framework convention, it lays down the fundamental substantive and procedural 
rules of the regulation of international watercourses and leaves the details for the 
riparian states so that they can draw their water agreements in the context of 
their respective river basins in question and if possible, harmonize it with 
Watercourses Convention.6 
                                           
1
 The Convention was adopted on 21 May 1997 by G.A. Resolution 511229 with 106 
affirmative votes, 26 abstentions and three negative votes, i.e. Burundi, China and Turkey. 
See United Nations (1997a) General Assembly Official Records, 99
th
 Plenary Meeting 
(A/51/PV.99), 21 May 1997 p. 7- 8. For a full text see:  
   www.un.org/ga/documents/gares51/ga51–229.htm  
2
 Stephen C. McCaffrey, Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, United Nations Audiovisual library of international law 






  See the preamble of the Watercourse Convention, para 4. See also Salman M.A. Salman 
(2015), Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: Why should it matter?, 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 31:1, 4-16, , p.7. DOI: 
10.1080/07900627.2014.952072  
6
 Id., p. 8. 
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The most robust and elaborated contents of the Watercourses Convention 
have (arguably) exerted impact on the negotiations and development of 
transboundary water agreements and cooperation in different basins.7 The 
impact of the Watercourses Convention is more visible with regard to the 
conclusion of an international water framework agreement in the context of the 
Nile river basin. In 2010, a number of Nile river riparian states concluded Nile 
River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) that was meant to 
replace the previous non-inclusive Nile water agreements.8 The CFA is a 
milestone agreement in terms of bringing many riparian states on board and has 
incorporated many of the recent international water law principles. These 
contemporary international water principles have been influenced by the 
Watercourses Convention and it is important to examine the extent of the 
influence of the Watercourses Convention on the CFA. This article seeks to 
examine the influence of the Watercourses Convention into the substantive and 
procedural rules of the CFA.       
The first section discusses the various non-inclusive bilateral and multilateral 
water treaties that attempt to regulate the Nile River basin. Section 2 is an 
overview of the Watercourses Convention and the CFA. The third section 
examines the interface between the Watercourses Convention and the CFA and 
tries to indicate areas of influence of the substantive and procedural principles of 
the Watercourses Convention on the CFA. 
 
  
                                           
7
Around the time the ILC was in the last phase of preparing the 1994 draft articles, the 
number of water agreements negotiated and adopted was unusually high; two regional and 
a number of basin-level instruments were negotiated, including, at the regional level, the 
UNECE (1992) Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes and the (SADC, 1995), Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the 
Southern African Development Community; and, at the basin level, the Treaty on the 
Development and Utilization of Water Resources of the Komati River Basin (Kingdom of 
Swaziland and Republic of South Africa, 1992), the Convention on Cooperation for the 
Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River (ICPDR, 1994), and the Agreement on 
the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (MRC, 
1995), among others. See Christina Leb (2013): The UN Watercourses Convention: the 
éminence grise behind cooperation on transboundary water resources, Water International, 
38:2, 146-155. p.152-153.  
8
 The Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was signed by six of the 
riparian states, namely Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi, and has 
been ratified only by three, i.e., Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania.  The text of the CFA is 
available at Nile Basin Initiative, “Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative 
Framework opened for signature”, available at: 
  http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com.  
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1. The Nile River Basin and Non-inclusive Agreements  
The Nile is the longest river in the world. There are eleven Nile River riparian 
states including South Sudan. The total population of the Nile Basin countries is 
estimated at 400 million9 and 10 percent of the continent‟s land falls within the 
catchment area of the Nile River basin.10  The Nile has two major sources: the 
Blue and White Nile; both form the East African part of the Great Rift Valley.  
The Blue Nile originates in the Ethiopian highlands and constitutes about 86% 
of the annual flow of the Nile River.11 The White Nile has its main sources in 
Lake Victoria, which is shared by Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya.12 The White 
and Blue Nile flow north and meet around Khartoum, Sudan, creating the Nile, 
which eventually flows into Egypt and on into the Mediterranean Sea.13 At 84 
billion cubic meters, the Nile‟s average annual runoff is „modest in comparison 
to the other major river systems in Africa, while the demand for its water is 
much higher‟.14  
A number of treaties on the Nile River were concluded during the last two 
centuries, and all of them are either less comprehensive or non-inclusive 
agreements.  The “Treaty between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, Relative 
to the Frontiers between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea”, was 
concluded in 1902 in Addis Ababa.15 The 1902 Agreement stipulates that the 
Ethiopian King will not „construct, or allow to be constructed, any work across 
                                           
9
 Ahmed Ibrahim and Alaa El-Nahry (2017), Population Growth and Impacts of Nile Water 
Deficiency on Egypt using Gis and other techniques, Egypt. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305034095 (accessed 05 September , 2018), p.1.  
10
 Peter Kagwanja (2007), „Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict 
over the Nile Resources‟, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1:3, 321-337, p.323. DOI: 
10.1080/17531050701625565  
11
 Tesfaye Tafesse (2001), „The Nile Question: Hydropolitics, Legal Wrangling, Modus 
Vivendi, and Perspectives‟. Lit., Münster,  p. 24. 
12
 Salman M.A. Salman (2013), „The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework  Agreement: a 
peacefully unfolding African spring?,‟ Water International, 38:1, 17-29, , p17.  DOI: 
10.1080/02508060.2013.744273  
13
 Jeffrey D. Azarva (2011), „Conflict on the Nile: International Watercourse Law and the 
Elusive Effort to Create a Transboundary Water Regime in the Nile Basin‟, 25 Temple 
International and Comparative Law Journal. pp. 457- 461. 
14
 Broth Ashok Swain (2002), „The Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too 
Little‟, SAIS Review, Volume 22, Number 2, Summer-Fall, 293-308, p.294 citing Robert 
Rangeley, Bocar M. Thiam, Randolph A. Andersen, and Colin A. Lyle (1994), 
International River Basin Organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: World 
Bank Technical Paper No. 250. 
15
 Nile Treaty, 1902. Treaty between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom, relative to the 
frontiers between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea (hereinafter 1902 
Treaty). Available from: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ documentation/english/a_5409.pdf 
[Accessed 04 December 2017]. 
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the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana or the Sobat which would arrest the flow of their 
waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty‟s 
Government and the Government of the Sudan ‟.16 Irrespective of the arguments 
surrounding validity of the 1902 Treaty, the agreement is non-inclusive and 
„merely required Ethiopia not to “arrest” (i.e. cut off) the Nile waters‟.17 
Another non-inclusive agreement is the 1929 Nile Water Agreement18 signed 
between Egypt and Great Britain on behalf of its colonies (Sudan, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanganyika which is the present day Tanzania).  It embodied the 
following: 
„save with the previous agreement of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation 
or power works or measures are to be constructed or taken on the River Nile 
and its branches, or on the lakes from which it flows, so far as all these are in 
the Sudan or in countries under British administration, which would, in such 
a manner as to entail any prejudice to the interests of Egypt, either reduce the 
quantity of water arriving in Egypt, or modify the date of its arrival, or lower 
its level‟.19  
The 1929 agreement allocated much of the bulk of the annual flow of the 
River Nile (forty-eight billion cubic meters of water) to Egypt and four billion to 
Sudan.20 The allocation of the 1929 Nile agreements was largely in favor of 
Egypt and to a limited extent to Sudan. There was expansion of irrigation 
projects (that caused additional water needs) following the Egyptian revolution 
in 1952. After the independence of Sudan (in 1956), it forced Egypt to enter into 
                                           
16
 Id., Art. III.   
17
 Elias N. Stebek (2007), „Eastern Nile at Crossroads: Preservation and Utilization 
Concerns in Focus‟, Mizan Law Review Vol. 1 No.1, June 2007, 33-59, p. 52.  
    DOI:  dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v1i1.55613 
18
 Nile Treaty, 1929. Exchange of notes between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
Egypt in regard to the use of the waters of the River Nile for irrigation purposes, Cairo, 
May 1929. 
19
  Id., Art. 4 (b).   
20
  Paul Howell (1994), „East Africa's Water Requirements: The Equatorial Nile Project and 
the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929: A Brief Historical Review‟, in the Nile: Sharing a 
Scarce Resource: An Historical and Technical Review of Water Management and 
Economic and Legal Issues, p.84-85. 
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renegotiation.21 Finally, the renegotiation culminated in the signing of a Nile 
water treaty in 1959.22 
The non-inclusive 1959 Nile water agreement23 provides for the „Full 
Utilization of the Nile Waters‟. According to the agreement, Egypt received 
55.5 billion cubic meters and Sudan 18.5 billion cubic meters of the Nile, out of 
the river‟s average annual flow of the 84 billion cubic meters. During the last 
six-decades, Egypt and Sudan had considered their share of 1959 Nile water 
agreement, as their „non-negotiable entitlement to the Nile waters‟.24  
The out-dated 1959 legal regime in the Nile Basin bestows almost „exclusive 
rights25 to Egypt and Sudan to exploit the Nile waters while barring other 
riparian states from using the Nile waters. Ethiopia refused to recognize the 
1959 Nile water treaty and was prompt in asserting that it has the right to exploit 
the Nile River to the benefits of its citizens.26 Ethiopia and other Nile upper 
riparian states hold a firm position that the 1959 agreement is „unfair, that it is 
valid between the two countries only, and that they need to harness the water in 
a fair and rational manner‟.27 
In 1961, upon initiation of Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, an 
organization called Hydromet (Hydrometeorological Survey of the Catchments 
of Lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Mobutu Sese Seko) was established with the 
assistance of the United Nations Development Program and the World 
Meteorological Organization and it was the first basin-wide arrangement.28 The 
purpose of the Hydromet project was to „evaluate the water balance of the Lake 
                                           
21
 Broth Ashok Swain, supra note 14, p. 296 citing Peter Wallensteen and Ashok Swain, 
Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the World, International 
Fresh Water Resources: Conflict or Cooperation? (Stockholm: Stockholm Environment 
Institute, 1997). 
22
 Ibid., citing Gabriel R. Warburg (1991), “The Nile in Egyptian-Sudanese Relations,” 
Orient 32, no.4, p. 570. 
23
 Nile Treaty, 1959. Agreement between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of the 
Sudan for the full utilization of the Nile waters, 1959. 453. 
24
 Robert O. Collins (2006), Negotiations and Exploitation of the Nile Waters at the End of 
the Millennium, Water International, 31:1, 116-126, p.124.  
   DOI: 10.1080/02508060608691921,  
25
 Peter Kagwanja (2007), Calming the Waters: The East African Community and Conflict 
over the Nile Resources, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1:3, 321-337, p.322.   
    DOI: 10.1080/17531050701625565  
26
 Alan Nicol (2003), The Nile: Moving Beyond Cooperation, printed by UNESCO, Division 
of Water Science, Paris, France. Available at: http//www.unesco.org/water/wwap/pccp 
(accessed 05 September, 2018), p.13.  
27
 Mohammed Abdo (2005), „The Relevance and Contribution of the UN Watercourses 
Convention toward Resolving the Problems in the Nile Basin‟, the CEPMLP Internet 
Journal, Volume 15, Article 8, Dundee University, Scotland, April 2005, p.6. 
28
 Robert O. Collins, supra note 24, p.118. 
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Victoria catchment area in order to assist in regulating the water level of the lake 
as well as the water flow of the Nile. Later, Rwanda and Burundi joined in the 
effort‟.29 However, Hydromet failed to develop an effective basin level 
cooperation institutional arrangement.30 
In 1983, upon Egypt‟s initiative, and following the consent of other Nile 
river basin countries Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, and the Central African Republic 
UNDUGU (“Ndugu” is Swahili for brotherhood) was established to serve as a 
permanent institution to foster basin-wide cooperation beyond the level of 
hydrological studies.31 After the establishment of UNDUGU, members of the 
organization „had some common interests in the Nile waters‟.32  
In December 1992 at the 67th meeting of UNDUGU in Kampala, six 
ministers for water resources from Egypt, Sudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
and Congo were convinced to „reorganize the organization into a forum for 
consultation among the riparians on the utilization of the river‟s resources for 
development from scientific and technical matters‟.33 The Technical Cooperation 
Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection 
of the Nile (TECCONILE) was regarded as an enhanced basin wide institutional 
cooperation as compared to the largely dysfunctional UNDUGU.34 However, 
TECCONILE proved another frustrating experience in terms of creating an 
inclusive and working institutional arrangement.35    
In March 199836, there was a significant development upon the conclusion of 
an agreement by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin 
States over the sharing and management of the Nile River, and their new 
                                           
29




 Mohamed S. Helal (2013), Inheriting International Rivers: State Succession to Territorial 
Obligations, South Sudan, and the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement Emory International Law 
Review, p. 933 citing Korwa Adar (2007), „The Interface between National Interest and 
Regional Stability: The Nile River and the Riparian States,‟ 11 Afr. Soc. Rev. 4, p.8.  
32
 Robert O. Collins, supra note 24, p. 118. 
33
 Mohamed S. Helal , supra note 31, p. 933 citing Abdel Fattah Metawie (2004), „History 
of Co-operation in the Nile Basin‟, 20 International Journal of Water Resources 
Development,  47,54. 
34
 Robert O. Collins, supra note 24, p. 118. 
35
  Ibid.  
36
 Prior to the 1998 conclusion of an agreement by Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of 
the Nile Basin States, some preparatory works were underway.  In February 1995, the 
Nile River Basin Action Plan was adopted during the Nile-COM's third meeting in 
Arusha; in 1996, work had started toward drafting the Nile River Basin Cooperative 
Framework Agreement by the Panel of experts.  
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approval of a new program of action.37 This gave birth to a new era of hope and 
cooperation and it led to the formal commencement of the Nile Basin Initiative 
(NBI) in February 1999. The NBI was meant to serve an ad-hoc arrangement 
until the „Nile river riparian member countries agree on a permanent legal and 
institutional framework for sustainable development of the Nile Basin‟ and the 
majority of the Nile river riparian states38 agreed on the CFA in 2010.39 It 
remains to be seen whether CFA will live up to expectations.  
2. Overview of the Watercourses Convention and the CFA  
The UN Watercourses Convention seeks to lay down the basic international 
norms governing the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.40 The 
key aim of the Convention is to „ensure the utilization, development, 
conservation, management, and protection of international watercourses and the 
promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof for present and 
future generations‟; whilst „taking into account the special situation and needs of 
developing countries‟.41 As McCaffrey notes, the Convention should be 
regarded as „an instrument that reflects a general consensus as to the principles 
that are universally applicable in the field‟, irrespective of its ratification.42 
The Watercourses Convention underlines the importance of data in water 
resource management and calls on states to share such data43, unless „such data 
is vital to national security‟.44  The Convention also calls on member states to 
                                           
37
 Broth Ashok Swain, supra note 14, p 419. 
38
 On 14 May 2010, four of the Nile riparians (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) 
signed the CFA in Entebbe, Uganda, and were joined five days later by Kenya. On 28 
February 2011, Burundi joined the five states and signed the CFA. Although the two 
riparian states South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo indicated their support 
of the CFA, they have not yet signed it.  
39
 Broth Ashok Swain, supra note 14, p. 14. 
40
 For a detailed analysis of the Convention, see A. Tanzi and M. Arcari (2001), The United 
Nations Convention of the Law of International Watercourses – A Framework for Sharing 
(Kluwer,). See also P. K. Wouters (1999), „The Legal Response to International Water 
Conflicts: The UN Watercourses Convention and Beyond‟, 42 Ger. Y.B. Int’l L., p. 293 in 
Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Flavia Rocha Loures (2009), Still not in Force: Should States 
Support the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention? RECIEL 18 (2), p.188. 
41
 See Preamble, Watercourses Convention. 
42
 Marcella Nanni (2016), Water challenges in the IGAD region: towards new legal 
frameworks for cooperation, Water International, 41:4, 635-651, p.636.  
    DOI: 10.1080/02508060.2016.1169620;  citing McCaffrey, S.C.(2001). The Contribution 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 1(3/4), 250–263.  
   Doi: 10.1504/IJGENVI.2001.000980 
43
 Art 9 of the Watercourses Convention. 
44
 Id., Art. 31.  
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inform, consult, and if possible negotiate on adverse planned measures along 
international watercourses.45 Part IV of the Convention has some key 
contemporary international water law principles regarding the preservation of 
freshwater and marine ecosystems, or reducing pollution and not introducing 
alien species.46 There are some articles on joint management, regulation and 
protection of installations,47 and the responsibility to deal with emergency 
situations48 and armed conflict.49 Article 33 deals with the peaceful resolution of 
disputes. 
Nile riparian states have participated in the preparation, and adoption process 
of the Watercourses Convention. Even though Kenya and Sudan, voted in favor 
of the Watercourses Convention,50 none of the Nile riparians has yet ratified the 
agreement.51 One of the Nile river states, Burundi, voted against the Convention. 
It is not known why Burundi voted against the Convention, having not been an 
active participant in the working group.52 Ethiopia, Egypt, and Tanzania for 
different reasons abstained. On the one hand, two upper riparians (Ethiopia and 
Tanzania) abstained during the adoption of the Convention and they seem to 
have considered the Convention as „biased in favour of lower riparians because 
of its specific and separate mention of the obligation not to cause harm‟.53 
Uganda, DRC and Eritrea were absent during the adoption process of the 
convention. 54 On the other hand, Egypt, a downstream state, also abstained, 
concerned that the Convention „favours upstream riparians because it 
subordinates the no harm rule to the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization‟.55    
The CFA has 44 articles, classified into six parts, which are General 
Principles, Right and Obligations, Institutional Structure, Subsidiary Institutions, 
Miscellaneous Provisions, and Final clauses. The CFA lays down some basic 
                                           
45
 Id., Arts. 11-19. 
46
 Id., Arts. 20-23. 
47
 Id., Arts. 24-26.  
48
 Id., Arts. 27-28.  
49
 Id., Arts. 29-32. 
50
 Mohammed Abdo, supra note 27, p.2.  
51
 Joyeeta Gupta (2016), The Watercourses Convention, Hydro-hegemony and 
Transboundary Water Issues, The International Spectator, 51:3, 118-131, p.125.  
    DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2016.1198558 
52
 Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Flavia Rocha Loures, supra note 40, p.190. 
53
 See Salman M.A. Salman (2015),  Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: 
why should it matter?, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 31:1, 4-
16, p.11.    DOI: 10.1080/07900627.2014.952072 
54
 Mohammed Abdo, supra note 27, p.2.  
55
 Ibid.  
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principles for the protection, use, conservation and development of the Nile 
Basin.56 The CFA reestablishes the contemporary international water law 
principle of fair and equitable utilization that each Nile Basin riparian state has 
the right to use, within its respective territory, the waters of the Nile River Basin 
in an equitable and fair manner without causing significant harm.57 The Nile 
Basin Initiative was indeed a „departure in the management of the Nile, for its 
objective was equitable utilization that would erode historic rights‟.58 The Nile 
Basin Initiative has sought to ease „the traditionally hostile Nile riparians and 
create a spirit of cooperation among them‟.59  
The CFA was signed by six of the riparian states, namely Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, and Burundi, and has been ratified only by three, i.e., 
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania.60 These upstream states signed and ratified the 
CFA after stalled negotiations, and they realized that „they had no choice but to 
resort to the next move: opening the CFA for signature‟.61 Egypt and Sudan 
have refused on the ground that the water quota as stipulated in the 1959 
bilateral water treaties was not preserved and their current uses and rights have 
not been legally protected.62   
3. The Interface between Watercourses Convention and the CFA 
The Watercourses Convention duly promotes general principles of international 
water law at global level and it has been replicated in regional watercourses 
such as the Nile River.63 In international watercourses, there is no alternative 
other than cooperation in order to achieve fair and equitable utilization, the 
principle of no significant harm, protecting, and preserving shared ecosystems.64 
The Watercourses Convention seeks „the comprehensive codification of 
cooperation obligations‟ and it explicitly spells out „the duty to cooperate as one 
of the contemporary principles of international water law‟.65 In the same 
                                           
56
 Art 6 of CFA. 
57
 Art 4 of CFA.  
58
 Robert O. Collins, supra note 24, p. 120.  
59
 Id., p.125.  
60
 See the official website of the Nile Basin Initiative at www.nilebasin.org   
61
 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2017), „The Nile Basin Initiative and the Cooperative 
Framework Agreement: Failing Institutional Enterprises? A Script in Legal History of the 
Diplomatic Confront (1993–2016)‟, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 11, No.1, p. 203. 
    DOI:  dx.doi.org/10.4314/mlr.v11i1.7 
62
  See Art. 14 (b) of the FA and the annex to the CFA agreement.  
63
 Christina Leb (2013), „The UN Watercourses Convention: the éminence grise behind 
cooperation on transboundary water resources‟, Water International, 38:2, 146-155. 
p.146. 
64
  Ibid. 
65
  Ibid.  
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manner, the CFA incorporates the provisions of the Watercourses Convention 
on equitable and reasonable utilization, the obligation not to cause significant 
harm, cooperation and exchange of data and information.66   
3.1 Definition of international watercourses  
The Watercourses Convention67 defines „international watercourse‟ as „a 
watercourse, parts of which are situated in different states‟.68 The Convention 
confirms the equality of riparian states (sovereign equality) and the entitlement 
of every riparian state to the equal recognition of rights and status irrespective of 
their geographical location.69 To this end, Watercourse States shall „cooperate 
on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good 
faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an 
international watercourse‟.70     
It defines the term watercourse to include both „surface water and ground 
waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and 
normally flowing into a common terminus‟.71 This definition includes only 
underground water connected to surface water.72 In other words, the definition 
in the Watercourses Convention includes „groundwater that is hydrologically 
connected with surface water, which is in fact the case for much of the world‟s 
groundwater‟.73 It does not include international aquifers that are not connected 
to surface waters.74  
By focusing only on connected ground and surface waters and not river 
basins, the Convention limited „the control of the regime to the water as opposed 
to the land in watersheds‟.75 It does not incorporate the expansion of the 
definition of groundwater under the Seoul Rules which includes transboundary 
aquifers that are not connected with the surface waters of an international 
                                           
66
 Marcella Nanni, supra note 42, p. 636,  citing McCaffrey, S. C. (2001). International 
Water Law for the 21st Century: The Contribution of the UN Convention. 118 Water 
Resources Update 11. 
67
 At the outset, it was not found necessary to determine the scope of the expression 
„international watercourse‟. In fact, the organ in charge of drafting the Watercourses 
Convention did not define this expression until it adopted a full set of draft articles on the 
topic in 1991. The definition adopted in 1991 is substantially unchanged in the 
Convention. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, supra note 2, p.1.   
68
 Art  2 (b) of the Watercourse Convention. 
69
 Joyeeta Gupta, supra note 51, p.122. 
70
 Art 8 (1) of the Watercourses Convention.   
71
 Art  2 (a) of the Watercourses Convention. 
72
 Salman M.A. Salman, supra note 53, p.8. 
73
 Stephen C. McCaffrey, supra note 2, p.2.  
74
 Salman M.A. Salman, supra note 53, p.8. 
75
 Joyeeta Gupta, supra note 51, p.124. 
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drainage basin.76 Although the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted 
restrictive approach in defining watercourse, the ILC had issued a parallel 
resolution suggesting that the Watercourses Convention regulate other 
characteristics of underground water.77 
CFA distinguishes Nile watercourse into „Nile River Basin‟ and „Nile River 
System‟. It defines Nile River Basin as „the geographical area determined by the 
watershed limits of the Nile River System of waters; this term is used where 
there is a reference to environmental protection, conservation or development‟.78 
It defines Nile River System as „the Nile River and the surface waters and 
ground waters which are related to the Nile River; this term is used where there 
is a reference to utilization of water‟.79 The wording appears to be similar to the 
notion of „river ecosystem expression employed by the ILC during the course of 
drafting of the UN Watercourses Convention – to refer to river streams as such 
and the waters they carry‟.80 
During the CFA negotiation, Egypt argued that Nile River System shall 
apply to both „environmental protection and water allocation‟.81 This would 
mean, according to Egypt, Nile River System should not only include the water 
allocation as per the 1959 Nile Agreement between Egypt and Sudan (blue 
water) but should also include the underground and surface water that falls in all 
the Nile riparian states (green water) and should be subject to regulation.82 
Ethiopia, on the other hand, argued to limit the scope of the Nile river system to 
refer to the Nile river streams discourse „because of its clear geographical 
implication beyond the water bodies‟.83   
The Watercourses Convention and the CFA have employed a restrictive 
definition of watercourse and Nile River system respectively as far as utilization 
and regulation are concerned. This restrictive interpretation seems to have 
considered the concerns of many upstream riparian states as it places very 
limited restrictions on the notion of the sovereignty of the states.84 The 
Watercourses Convention and the CFA limit „each basin state‟s sovereign 
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discretion with regard to the utilization of the main channels of the Nile, 
tributaries, as well as sub–tributaries, rivulets and groundwater systems availed 
throughout the basin – so long as they form part of a unitary whole‟.85 
3.2 Principles of equitable utilization and no significant harm 
Equality of rights of co-riparians is one of the key principles of the Watercourses 
Convention and CFA and this has been manifested in both agreements through 
the incorporation of principles of equitable utilization and no significant harm.  
The provisions of the CFA on equitable and reasonable utilization and the 
obligation against causing significant harm are some of the most unsettled issues 
and the same is true with regard to the Watercourses Convention.86 The 
Watercourses Convention which embodies provisions on equitable and 
reasonable utilization and the obligation against causing significant harm 
(Articles 5 to 7) was adopted with 38 affirmative votes, 22 abstentions and four 
negative votes, namely those of China, France, and Turkey including of the Nile 
river riparian state, Tanzania. 87  
3.2.1 The Principle of equitable and reasonable utilization  
The principle of equitable utilization has received wide acceptance, and its 
status is reinforced by international water agreements, state practice and 
international judicial decisions. Article 5(1) of the Watercourses Convention 
provides that: 
Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an 
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States 
with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and 
benefits therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States 
concerned, consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.    
In a similar fashion, Article 4 of the CFA (in the context of the Nile basin) 
has reproduced the above provision:  
Nile Basin States shall in their respective territories utilize the water 
resources of the Nile River system and the Nile River Basin in an equitable 
and reasonable manner. In particular, those water resources shall be used and 
developed by Nile Basin States with a view to attaining optimal and 
sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, taking into account the 
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interests of the Basin States concerned, consistent with adequate protection 
of those water resources. Each Basin State is entitled to an equitable and 
reasonable share in the beneficial uses of the water resources of the Nile 
River system and the Nile River Basin. 
One of the core principles in the Watercourses Convention and the CFA –the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization– is a fundamental principle of 
contemporary international water law transboundary water resources,88 and it 
constitutes „the conceptual backbone of international water law‟89 thereby 
entitling every riparian country, „within its territory, to a reasonable and 
equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international river‟.90 
The CFA has adopted the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization in the 
context of the Nile River and many of the wordings are inspired by the 
normative contents of the Watercourses Convention. Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that the CFA‟s normative contents of the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization are borrowed from the Watercourses Convention.91  
With regard to the application of the equitable utilization principle, the 
Watercourses Convention entrusts states that have different interests with the 
primary responsibility (including interpretation of the factors and circumstances 
under Art. 6). On the other hand, the CFA seems to have anticipated the 
problems, and Art. 4(6) states that the Nile basin shall only observe rules and 
procedures established by the Nile River Basin Commission for the effective 
implementation of the equitable principle.92 It thus seems that the CFA leaves no 
room for unilateral interpretation.93  
The Nile River Basin Commission is established by the Nile river basin 
states, and the final policy-related decisions are made by the Conference of 
Heads of State and Government which is composed of Heads of State and 
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Government of Nile Basin States.94 The executive organ of the Nile River Basin 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, which is composed of Minister for Water 
Affairs of each Nile Basin State and other relevant ministers, decide on the 
principles of the CFA including the application of the principle of fair and 
equitable utilization of the Nile River by consensus.95 The consensus decision-
making processes of the Nile River Basin Commission gives the Nile River 
states a room for interpretation of the principle of fair and equitable utilization 
of the Nile River according to list of factors that advances their respective 
national interests, and this can create vicious circle of disputes.  
The Watercourses Convention and CFA have relatively similar substantive 
content in enumerating the list of factors such as population, current and 
potential use, geography and others that should be taken into consideration by 
each Nile river basin state in the application of the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization.  CFA goes further and supplements two additional factors 
adopted from the Helsinki Rules (Article V), i.e., water contribution of each 
Nile riparian state and the extent of the drainage basin within each Nile river 
state.96   
The Watercourses Convention has the non-exhaustive list of criteria for the 
determination of the utilization of an international watercourse and „leaves the 
weighting of these criteria to be decided on a case-by-case basis‟.97 It is not clear 
which list of criteria is applied for water allocation purpose.98 The CFA has 
taken the same approach that decisions regarding the application of the lists of 
the factors of principles of equitable and reasonable utilization can be adapted 
within the context of the Nile basin. However, the Watercourses Convention in 
its „current formulations, cannot guide adjustments to current water shares 
between the countries‟.99  
The Watercourses Convention has transmitted one of its serious weaknesses 
to the CFA „which limits its utility as a working document by permitting the 
riparian states in dispute to engage in almost endless discussion over all the 
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factors which might be considered‟.100 As a result, the Watercourses Convention 
is not helpful in providing guidelines as to how the lists of factors are to be 
assessed. This makes it difficult to apply the CFA in a context of potential water 
dispute.101 The same can be concluded about the application of equitable and 
reasonable utilization in the Nile river basin. 
While Article 6 of the Watercourses Convention, inter alia, intends „to 
closely guide water allocation‟, it „leaves unresolved the level of detail and other 
mechanisms required to take water allocation to a satisfying or unambiguous 
conclusion‟.102 Article 6 „runs the risk of steering riparians towards equalizing 
shares of water resources within transboundary watercourses while creating an 
illusion of guiding equitable water allocation‟.103 Unless this possible 
misdirection is recognized, Article 6 may have „limited utility‟.104 This 
shortcoming and limitations are also reflected in the CFA since the CFA is 
designed based on the Watercourses Convention.  
In due course of negotiations toward addressing the utilization of an 
international watercourse, the Watercourses Convention has formulated the 
fundamental principles of equitable and reasonable utilization of the water in 
ambiguous terms and has opened the room for „normative construction of 
ambiguity‟.105 It has been argued that „ambiguity is . . . commonly incorporated 
in agreements pertaining to natural resources, and water in particular‟,106 and the 
Watercourses Convention ambiguously „provides something for everyone, 
enabling all sides to claim partial victory while not providing any tools for 
resolving competing claims‟.107  
The ambiguity of the Watercourses Convention pertaining to the normative 
contents of principles of equitable and reasonable utilization is reflected by the 
marathon negotiations process108 and one may argue that this is what is 
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rationally expected of a framework convention.109 Applying the basic principles 
of equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse taking 
into consideration the specific characteristics of the Nile River Basin and other 
similar river basins and riparian states is, without doubt, a very difficult task.110  
Yet, the controversy surrounding the ambiguity pertaining to the regulation and 
utilization of an international watercourse is no justification to characterize the 
entire discourse as one featured with ambiguity. After all, the Watercourse 
Convention represents the on-going „codification and progressive development 
of rules of international law regarding non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses‟.111  
In spite of unsettled issues in connection with the application of a reasonable 
and equitable reallocation agreement for transboundary watercourses and its 
ambiguous application in the Nile River Basin, there is no alternative 
mechanism better than the framework under the Watercourses Convention.112 It 
should, thus, not be overlooked that for Nile riparians, the Watercourses 
Convention „provides a starting point for the negotiation of agreements relating 
to specific watercourses, and, in the absence of any applicable agreement, it sets 
basic parameters governing the conduct of states riparian to those 
watercourses‟.113    
3.2.2. The Obligation not to cause significant harm  
Article 7 of the 1997 Convention provides that “Watercourse States shall, in 
utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate 
measures to prevent causing of significant harm to other watercourse states”, 
and it further states: “The emphasis on prevention is important, since it is often 
difficult to stop or modify an activity once it has began, and it can be very 
complicated and expensive, if indeed it is possible, to remedy harm once 
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caused”.114  This is reproduced in the context of the Nile river basin in Article 5 
of the CFA which reads:  
Nile Basin States shall, in utilizing Nile River System water resources in 
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of 
significant harm to other Basin States. 
Article 7 of the Watercourses Convention and Article 5 of the CFA deal with 
the obligation not to cause significant harm and is an „expression of the sic utere 
principle‟.115 In the Convention and the CFA there seems to be tension between 
the obligation dealing with „equitable and reasonable utilization‟, and with its 
„obligation not to cause significant harm‟. It seems for both to be achieved at the 
same time without problems.116 It can be safely concluded that one area of 
interface between the Watercourses Convention and CFA is the recognition of 
an obligation on riparian states not to cause significant harm in the course of 
their utilization of water resources within their territories.  
3.3 Prioritization of water use rights  
One the fundamental issues addressed by the Watercourses Convention is the 
prioritization of water use rights. The general rule is that „in absence of 
agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international watercourse 
enjoys inherent priority over other uses‟ 117 Article 10 of the Watercourse 
Convention states the correlation between different kinds of uses, and provides 
that „no use of an international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other 
uses‟.118 Conflict between uses of such watercourse “shall be resolved with 
reference to Articles 5 to 7 (equitable and reasonable use of water and the 
principle of non significant harm)‟.119 Moreover, the Watercourses Convention 
states that in the event of a conflict, it should be resolved „with special regard 
being given to the requirements of vital human needs‟.120  
United Nations General Assembly has held that „in determining „basic 
human needs‟, special attention is to be paid to providing sufficient water to 
sustain human right, including both drinking water and water required for 
production of food in order to prevent starvation‟.121 Thus, drinking water is the 
most vital human need. It implies that water for cooking and washing to 
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maintain public health standards also fall within the scope of vital human needs. 
Likewise, Article 3(14) of the CFA recognizes the  „social and economic value‟ 
of water and states that „utilization should give priority to its most economic 
use, taking into account the satisfaction of basic human needs and the 
safeguarding of ecosystems‟. The CFA has thus afforded absolute protection to 
basic human needs and their normative content seems to be inspired by the 
Watercourse Convention.  
Article 10 of the UN Watercourses Convention is relatively specific than the 
CFA when it comes to prioritizing water use rights except in the context of basic 
human needs, in respect of which both are in harmony. There is mismatch 
between the phrases in the Convention and the CFA with regard to clarity of 
principle in establishing which types of water uses shall be accorded priority in 
any given setting.122  
On the other hand, the CFA goes beyond the Convention, by clearly 
incorporating new guiding principles relevant to the allocation of waters –such 
as the principle that „water shall have social and economic value‟. Applying 
economic values in the Nile entails giving priority to the water's most economic 
uses (without compromising social uses and environmental protection).123 This 
is a great departure from the equitable use principle of the UN Watercourses 
Convention –since it affects the order of priority accorded to irrigation, 
industrial waters, aquaculture, tourism, hydro-power etc.124 In view of such 
different standards for setting a test in prioritizing water use rights, the 
Watercourses Convention and CFA still suffer from common problems. The 
„equitable use‟ principle of the UN Watercourses Convention and the phrase 
„social and economic value' used in CFA (to define a standard of prioritization 
of water use) seem to need further clarity in future frameworks.  
3.4  Duty to exchange data and information on planned measures  
The duty to exchange data and information on planned measures is different 
from the regular exchange of data and information. The Watercourses 
Convention imposes obligation on state parties to exchange (on a regular basis) 
readily available data and information on the condition of the watercourse.125 In 
a similar manner, the CFA has adopted the principle of exchange of data and 
information concerning the Nile River Basin.126 The Watercourses Convention 
envisages that the regular exchange of data and information may not be confined 
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to already available information that is not readily available. On the other hand, 
the CFA only imposes reciprocal obligations to exchange data and information 
that are „readily available and relevant‟.127 
The duty to cooperate is one of the contemporary principles of international 
water law that is unequivocally recognized in the Watercourses Convention and 
the CFA. This includes the duty to exchange data and information on planned 
measures. Article 11 lays down the general duty to exchange, consult and 
negotiate information concerning planned measures, and it explicitly makes it an 
obligation to „exchange information and consult each other and, if necessary, 
negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of an 
international watercourse‟. Moreover, the Watercourses Convention imposes an 
obligation on the planning state to adopt and notify measures that may have the 
potential adverse effects on other riparian states and the planning state must 
exchange all proper and suitable information.128 In connection with notification 
on planned measures, the Watercourses Convention states that „before a 
watercourse state implements or permits the implementation measures which 
may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse states, it shall 
provide those states with timely notification thereof‟.129  
The Watercourses Convention imposes an obligation on the potentially 
affected riparian states to reply, study and evaluate the transmitted information 
and its potential adverse effects in connection with planned measures within a 
maximum period of six months.130 The same Convention lays down an obligation 
on the potentially affected riparian states to communicate their assessment of the 
potential adverse effects of the planned measures to the notifying riparian states 
within six months.131 The Watercourses Convention aims to ensure the equitable 
participation of notifying state and potentially affected riparian states.132 The 
notifying state may be asked for additional appropriate data and information 
within six months which may be extended for an additional period of six months 
and the planned measure will remain in limbo during that period.133 The 
notifying state shall not within the timeframe of six months and possible 
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extension of another six months134 „implement or permit the implementation of 
the planned measures without the consent of the notified states‟.135 
If the notified riparian state reaches at the conclusion that there is no adverse 
impact, then the notifying state can go ahead with the planned measures. If the 
potentially affected state reaches at a different conclusion, it shall communicate 
its evaluation of the impact assessment of the planned measure within the 
aforementioned time framework.136 Then, negotiations must naturally follow 
with the objective of reaching an „equitable resolution of the situation‟137 within 
the conceptual framework of the Watercourses Convention. The Convention 
requires good faith during the course of the negotiations.138  
The Watercourses Convention allows the notifying state to go ahead with the 
planned measures even in the presence of adverse effect where there are 
emergency situations such as health, or security reasons.139 However, the other 
watercourse states must be informed thereof; the notification procedure 
described above must be initiated immediately afterwards; and the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization, as well as the no-significant harm rule, will 
remain in full effect.140 
The duty to exchange data and information pertaining to planned measures 
has been one of the most contentious issues during the course of the CFA 
negotiations. The CFA has adopted some of the normative contents of the 
Watercourses Convention on exchange of data and information in connection 
with planned measures. The CFA stipulates the principle that „the Nile basin 
states shall exchange on planned measures through the Nile River Basin 
Commission‟.141 In the earlier draft of the CFA, the procedural rules pertaining 
to exchange of data and information on the planned measures were borrowed 
from the Watercourses Convention; and all Nile river riparian states except 
Ethiopia supported it.142 Egypt and Sudan pushed for stringent notification, 
consultation and negotiation procedures based on the framework of the 
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Watercourse Convention.143 Egypt strongly argued that evaluation and 
authorization of any planned measures along the Nile River must be decided 
through general agreement and must be accompanied by mandatory 
procedures.144  
Ethiopia‟s objection to the proposal (forwarded principally by Egypt) 
promoted the notion that the issue of planned measures could be accommodated 
through the regular exchange of data and information.145 Ethiopia‟s objection of 
the detailed Watercourses Convention pertaining to planned measures was based 
on „fears of negative effect which its application may generate‟ because „upriver 
projects would be blocked (or vetoed against)‟ in the absence of basin-wide 
consent, „or at best, the proposals would be subjected to rigorous procedural 
processes hindering the implementation of pressing national development 
schemes on the Nile‟.146 Ethiopia further suggested that the issue of planned 
measures becomes „relevant if and only if a water-sharing arrangement 
acceptable to the basin states is put in place‟.147 The detailed procedural rules of 
the Watercourses Convention on planned measures were removed from the 
contents of the CFA and procedural details were left to the future Nile River 
Basin Commission.148  
The CFA chose to adopt a more general principle that can enable the Nile 
basin states to exchange information on planned measures through the Nile 
River Basin Commission.149 Consequently, the Watercourses Convention and 
the current contents of the CFA regarding the procedures concerning planned 
measures are different. The CFA adopts a less detailed principle that only 
requires: 
„the regular and reciprocal exchange among states of the Nile River Basin of 
readily available and relevant data and information on existing measures and 
on the condition of water resources of the basin, where possible in a form 
that facilitates its utilization by the states to which it is communicated‟.150 
Thus, it can be concluded that the robust procedural rules pertaining 
notification and consultation on planned measures, similar to those under the 
Watercourses Convention, have not been incorporated in the CFA. The 
ramification of such divergent approach is that Nile River states (and the 
upstream countries in particular) may be reluctant to notify and consult planned 
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measures along the Nile River. The absence of mutually acceptable procedural 
arrangements pertaining to any planned measures along the Nile River within 
the CFA could trigger tensions and confrontations among the Nile riparian 
states. The adverse effect of any planned measures along an international 
watercourse can be avoided if detailed procedural arrangements are adopted 
within the CFA.  
3.5 Potential fate of existing and future agreements    
States have the liberty to enter into water treaties which „apply and adjust‟ the 
normative contents of the Convention to a specific river basin.151 The 
Watercourses Convention will serve as the framework agreement for future 
watercourse agreements, and once such agreements are concluded, it will not 
alter the rights and obligations provided therein. According to Article 3, the 
Watercourses Convention will not supersede provisions contained in existing 
watercourse agreements, and will not „affect the rights or obligations‟ 
thereunder.152 This provision aims to open a room for ample flexibility in order 
to contextualize the Watercourses Convention in the context of specific river 
basins. The contents of the Watercourses Convention aim to „address the 
concerns of those States that felt that a mandatory review of the 3,600 or so 
existing watercourse agreements, upon entry into force of the Convention, 
would be unduly burdensome‟.153  
Other states, such as, Ethiopia, however, felt that harmonization of 
obligations between the current water agreements and the Watercourses 
Convention must be boldly capitalized.154 Article 3 was therefore the product of 
two very divergent views and unsurprisingly did not satisfy all. Ultimately, 35 
countries voted in favour of the revised text, while 3 countries (Ethiopia, France 
and Turkey) voted against it, and 22 abstained.155 Thus, the Watercourses 
Convention envisages harmonization between existing agreements and the 
Convention. Indeed, it is often the case that „negotiations of an international 
agreement are aimed not only at the elaboration of provisions governing certain 
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aspects of the subject matter, but also specifically at the avoidance of explicit 
provisions on other aspects‟.156  
The CFA, on the other hand, finds itself at logger-heads with the past 
colonial water agreements and is meant to replace all previous non-inclusive 
water agreements on the Nile. The CFA at the request of Egypt and Sudan has 
incorporated „Water Security‟157. However, CFA‟s non-legal and politically 
loaded terminology of „water security‟ is unique as there are no parallel 
international water law instruments (notably, the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 
UN Watercourses Convention) that embody the concept of water security.158  
The Watercourses Convention also envisages that if possible, the state party, 
signatory to the Convention, can harmonize previous agreements in force with 
the basic principles of the Convention.159 Certainly, this provision does not 
entail the obligation to negotiate the revision of an existing watercourse 
agreement that does not conform with the basic principles of the Convention.160 
Thus, it can be concluded that the Watercourses Convention bears little 
influence when it comes to harmonizing previous agreements and CFA, notably 
with the clear reservation of Egypt and Sudan.  
3.6 Dispute resolution mechanism  
The UN Charter requires member states to settle their disputes through peaceful 
means.161 Water resources are prone to conflicts and the UN Watercourses 
Convention envisages peaceful settlement of disputes, which includes 
negotiation, good offices and mediation, fact-finding and inquiry, conciliation 
and judicial means.162 The CFA has also adopted means of dispute settlement 
mechanisms including fact-finding commission. The Watercourses Convention 
and the CFA compel disputant parties to settle their differences through the 
requirement of impartial fact-finding commission if the parties to the water 
dispute fail to resolve their dispute by all other available means.163  
3.7 Institutionalization of cooperation  
With regard to cooperation, the Watercourses Convention promotes the 
institutionalization of cooperative water resources utilization, management, 
development and conservation.164 Joint commissions or other alternative 
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arrangements are vital tools for the institutionalization of cooperation. They 
provide important venue for continuous communication among riparian states at 
technical and political levels. Acknowledging this important role, the 
Convention refers to the „experience gained through cooperation in existing 
joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions‟.165  
In a similar fashion, CFA calls for the establishment of joint mechanisms of a 
permanent Nile River Basin Commission through which riparian states will have 
the platform to communicate on the utilization, management, development, and 
conservation of the Nile River.166 Article 16 of the CFA states the purpose and 
objective of the Commission, which has three main objectives:  
a) Promote and facilitate the implementation of the principles, rights and 
obligations of the Agreement;  
b) Serve as an institutional framework for cooperation among Nile Basin 
States in the use, development, protection, conservation and management 
if the Basin and its water; and   
c) Facilitate closer cooperation among states and peoples of the Nile River 
Basin in social, and culture fields.167 
The mandate of the Nile River Basin Commission further includes additional 
functions with regard to dispute settlement, information exchange and 
cooperation.168 Article 33 of the CFA gives the Nile River Basin Commission 
some role in dispute settlement among the Nile River riparian states. It urges the 
member states to use the Nile River Basin Commission as mediator or 
conciliator between the disputing parties.169 Thus, it is safe to conclude that the 
CFA embodies schemes toward the institutionalization of cooperation based on 
the Watercourses Convention.  
Concluding Remarks  
The Watercourses Convention has laid down the foundation in the codification 
of customary international law on non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses. It has a significant contribution in strengthening and laying down 
solid foundational rules with regard to substantive and procedural rules on the 
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regulation, utilization, and preservation of transboundary watercourses. The 
impact of the Watercourses Convention is indeed visible on a number of 
international watercourse agreements, and it is more evident in the Nile River 
basin.  
The CFA is the leading sub-regional legal instrument in regulating the 
utilization and preservation of the Nile River and many of its substantive and 
procedural rules are influenced by the models adopted by the Watercourses 
Convention. The general duty to cooperate in the utilization of an international 
watercourse, adherence to the general obligations of fair and equitable 
utilization of water resources, the duty not to cause significant harm are among 
the leading principles that are embodied in the Watercourses Convention and the 
CFA. The CFA has also relied heavily on the factors that should be taken into 
consideration in the determination of fair and equitable utilization of 
international water resources.  
Moreover, the Watercourses Convention has shaped the procedural contents 
of the CFA such as the duty to exchange information, settlement of disputes and 
the institutionalization of cooperation. The CFA has also inherited many of the 
limitations of the Watercourses Convention such as the interplay between 
determination of fair and equitable utilization of international water resources 
and the duty not to cause significant harm. The fate of existing and future water 
agreements and their status is still unsettled in the CFA, and the impact of the 
Watercourses Convention was limited in this regard.  
The influence of the Watercourses Convention on the general duty to 
exchange information is limited in the CFA, and it can be among the points of 
reference (to avoid potential water conflicts) when CFA adopts some robust and 
elaborated procedures on the general duty to notify, consult and negotiate on 
planned measures. Generally, however, the Watercourses Convention has a 
significant influence on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework 
Agreement (CFA). In the current era of conflict of interests among upper and 
lower riparians and potential water insecurity, it is hoped that the influence of 
the Watercourses Convention is set to dominate emerging developments in 
connection with the utilization, conservation, and management of the Nile 
River.                                                                                                                    ■ 
